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How to wrap it up – A formally verified proposal for the use of authenticated
wrapping in PKCS#11
Abstract—Being the most widely used and comprehensive stan-
dard for hardware security modules, cryptographic tokens and
smart cards, PKCS#11 has been the subject of academic study
for years. PKCS#11 provides a key store that is separate from
the application, so that, ideally, an application never sees a key
in the clear. Again and again, researchers have pointed out the
need for an import/export mechanism that ensures the integrity
of the permissions associated to a key. With version 2.40, for the
first time, the standard included authenticated deterministic
encryption schemes. The interface to this operation is insecure,
however, so that an application can get the key in the clear,
subverting the purpose of using a hardware security module.
This work proposes a formal model for the secure use of
authenticated deterministic encryption in PKCS#11, including
concrete API changes to allow for secure policies to be imple-
mented. Owing to the authenticated encryption mechanism,
the policy we propose provides more functionality than any
policy proposed so far and can be implemented without access
to a random number generator. Our results cover modes of
operation that rely on unique initialisation vectors (IVs), like
GCM or CCM, but also modes that generate synthetic IVs.
We furthermore provide a proof for the deduction soundness
of our modelling of deterministic encryption in Bo¨hl et. al.’s
composable deduction soundness framework.
1. Introduction
PKCS#11 is one of the Public-Key Cryptography Stan-
dards and was defined by RSA Security in 1994. By now, it
is the most prevalent standard for operating hardware secu-
rity modules (HSM), but also smart cards and cryptographic
libraries. It defines an API intended to separate usage and
storage of cryptographic secrets so that application code can
only access these secrets indirectly, via handles. The hope is
that HSMs provide a higher level of security than the multi-
purpose machines running the respective application. This
is reasonable: HSMs are designed for security and have less
functionality and therefore a smaller attack surface, making
them easier to secure. Consequently, PKCS#11 is used
throughout the public-key infrastructure and the banking
network.
In contrast to this stated goal, raising the level of secu-
rity, many versions and configurations of PKCS#11 allow
for attacks on the logical level [10, 14, 18, 11]. Here, a
perfectly valid chain of commands leads to the exposure
of sensitive key material to the application, defeating the
purpose of separating the (possibly vulnerable) application
from the (supposedly secure) hardware implementation —
and thus defeating their purpose. Formal methods have
been used to identify configurations that are secure [18,
11, 29]. In this context, a configuration or policy refers to
a specification of the device’s behaviour that implements
a subset of the standard, e.g., PKCS#11 with the restric-
tion that all keys generated must have a certain attribute
set. In order to be secure, the two most functional secure
policies [11, 29] either have to limit the ability to transfer
keys between devices [29] or have some keys degrade in
functionality after transfer, i.e., after transfer, they cannot
be used for operations that were permitted prior to trans-
fer [11]. Recent versions of PKCS#11 have adopted various
security extensions (e.g., wrapping/unwrapping templates,
‘wrap-with-trusted’), but none of these improve upon this
lack of functionality. Fundamentally, the problem is that the
export mechanism for keys (key wrapping, i.e., encrypting a
key with another key) does not provide a way to authenticate
the attributes or the role that a key should be imported with.
Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
provides a solution to this problem [36]. AEAD was not
available in 1994, when PKCS#11 was invented. Academic
development started around 2000 [25], standardisation fol-
lowed suit in 2004 [19]. With version 2.40, support for two
AEAD schemes was finally added to the set of supported
algorithms in PKCS#11, but as Steel pointed out [44], the
interface that v2.40 provides allows for a two-time pad
attack. The application is able to set the initialisation vector
(IV). If it chooses to use the same IV twice, wrapping can be
used to decrypt and obtain keys in the clear. Figure 1 depicts
why this attack works. Both GCM and CCM are based on
CTR-mode. If we leave out the computation of the message
authentication tag, it is easy to see that any cyphertext
can be decrypted by XORing it with the keystream that
is deterministically generated from the IV. Requesting an
encryption with the same IV is essentially a decryption
without the authenticity check.
This attack demonstrates that the mere support of AEAD
schemes is not enough, a suitable interface needs to be
provided, too. Unfortunately, this is not a trivial task. As
keys can be present on several devices at the same time,
each device individually needs to ensure that, globally, an
IV is not used twice. Hence in this paper, we tackle the
following questions:
I How can we guarantee global uniqueness even on
devices that lack a random number generator (RNG)?
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Figure 1: Example on key extraction using CTR-mode. By
supplying the same IV twice, the attacker can wrap a key
and then encrypt the resulting wrapping, again using the
same IV. This leads to the leakage of the key.
II Using authenticated encryption, is it possible to create
a secure PKCS#11 configuration that is strictly more
powerful than those proposed so far?
Contributions. The contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
1) We answer (I) and affirm (II) by proposing a secure
PKCS#11 configuration that uses authenticated encryp-
tion.
2) We formally verify this proposal in the symbolic model
and provide custom heuristics that allow for automated
proof generation. These results apply to the previously
proposed modes of operation GCM and CCM.
3) We put forward a deduction soundness [9] result, which
is a necessary condition for computational soundness.
It justifies the symbolic abstraction of AEAD and is
of independent interest for protocol verification. Be-
sides AEAD, it also supports hash functions, public-
key cryptography, digital signatures and MAC.
4) The PKCS#11 technical committee considered SIV
mode [40] as an alternative to GCM/CCM as it does
not require an initialisation vector [43]. We derive a
construction to obtain an AEAD scheme out of SIV
mode (in fact, any deterministic authenticated encryp-
tion scheme). This construction cancels out if we use it
in a particular way. With only slight syntactical modifi-
cation to our model we can thus derive a similar policy
for SIV mode while reusing the deduction soundness
result, model and heuristics.
2. PKCS#11
PKCS#11 provides applications an interface to cryp-
tographic implementations ranging from cryptographic li-
braries to smart cards and HSMs. Once an application
establishes a session to a device (slot in PKCS#11 parlance),
it identifies as a Security Officer (SO), or a normal user. The
SO may initialise a slot and set a PIN for the normal user.
Only if this PIN is set, the normal user can login. As we
consider the case where the application or the host computer
are malicious, we will abstract away from this and assume
the attacker has complete control over a session.
PKCS#11 exposes so-called objects, e.g., keys and cer-
tificates, to the user or attacker. They are referred to indi-
rectly, via handles. Handles do not reveal any information
about the object they refer to. Objects have attributes, some
of which are specific to their type (e.g., public keys of type
CKK RSA have a public exponent). Some however, are general
for all keys, and control how they can be used. E.g.:
‚ CKA SENSITIVE marks keys that ought not to be read out
in the clear.
‚ CKA DECRYPT marks keys that can be used to decrypt
cyphertexts.
‚ CKA WRAP marks wrapping keys: If C WrapKey is given
two handles, and the first has CKA WRAP, it uses the key
referred to by the first to encrypt the second. Wrapping
is used to export keys. Additional constraints apply to
the attributes associated to the second key, but we omit
them for simplicity. To import, the function C UnwrapKey
takes a handle and a wrapping (the cyphertext result-
ing from C WrapKey), decrypts the latter with the key
referred to by the handle, stores the results and returns
a handle to the newly generated object.
Typically, a given implementation supports only some of
the functionality specified by PKCS#11, first, because the
standard is extensive and contains many legacy algorithms,
but also because the full standard is insecure. Clulow’s
attack provides a nice and concise example [14]:
1) A key is generated and marked CKA SENSITIVE,
CKA DECRYPT and CKA WRAP.
2) The key is used to wrap itself, obtaining an encryption
of itself.
3) The key is used to decrypt the wrapping from the
previous step, obtaining the key in the clear.
This attack and others have prompted vendors to limit
the functionality offered by their respective implementa-
tions, which are often dubbed configurations or policies.
Some vendors introduced proprietary functionality, e.g.,
marking CKA DECRYPT and CKA WRAP as conflicting, but even
those were prone to attacks [11]. With version 2.20, wrap-
ping and unwrapping templates were introduced to control
what keys can be wrapped, and what attributes objects
created via unwrapping can obtain. While this mechanism
provides more flexibility, it does not improve the expressive-
ness of policies – these templates can essentially be hard-
coded in the device. In effect, two secure configurations
were discovered that are incomparable to each other, but
more or equally functional to the others found so far [11,
29].
The fundamental problem is that a wrapping does not
contain authenticated information about the role of the key
prior to the wrapping, i.e., its intended use. Hence, if it
is possible to wrap two keys that have different roles, it
is not clear which attributes a (re-)imported key should
obtain upon unwrapping — it could originate from a key
with either role. For instance, the first of the two most
functional policies [11] allows for two different roles to
be wrapped, but to be secure, the attributes obtained upon
unwrapping provide less capabilities than either role — the
keys ‘degrade’. The second of them [29] allows only keys
of a single role specific role to be wrapped.
Before OASIS took over standardisation from RSA Se-
curity in 2012, RSA drafted, but never published, version
2.30. Based on this draft, OASIS published version 2.40
in 2015, introducing support for AEAD schemes. AEAD
schemes can be used for wrapping, which finally provides a
way of authenticating a key’s attributes upon wrapping. Un-
fortunately, the API requires the user to set the initialization
vector, which allows for a simple attack where some vector
is used twice [44]. The security of the schemes supported
(AES-CCM and AES-GCM) relies on the uniqueness of
the initialisation vector, hence the upcoming standard 3.00
is planned to support device-internal nonce generation for
encryption/decryption.
The present work was motivated by the drafting of the
standard. We announced our results on the OASIS PKCS#11
mailing list and stressed the need to support device-internal
nonce generation for wrapping and encryption [5]. Assum-
ing that support for this is present in v3.00, our policy
provides a template for the secure use of PKCS#11. The
current version at time of writing is version 2.40 with errata
01 [32]. The most recent proposal for PKCS#11 v3.00 is
working draft 5 [33].
3. Policy
Our policy implements three central ideas: a key-
hierarchy, globally unique counters and authentication of
handles.
Key-hierarchy: keys are created with a given level, i.e., a
natural number, and may only be used to wrap and unwrap
keys of a lower level. If we extend this to payload data, we
can assign level 1 to payload and level 2 to encryption keys
that cannot wrap. Ergo, wrapping keys must have level 3 or
higher. When wrapping a key, we authenticate the level of
the enclosed key with the encryption. Upon unwrapping, this
level is restored. To be consistent with that, decryption only
succeeds if the cyphertext is authentic w.r.t. level 1. This
already prevents Clulow’s attack, as wrappings will never
be decrypted, since whatever level the wrapping key was
created with must be larger or equal to three.
Globally unique counters: The deduction soundness re-
sult that we will present in Section 7 holds only for protocols
that guarantee that AEADs are created with a unique initial-
isation vector. This is necessary, as otherwise, for counter-
mode based schemes like GCM and CCM, key-wrapping
can immediately be used to decrypt. The simplest way to
ensure this is to choose the IV randomly, however, many
low-cost devices do not have a random number genera-
tor. We thus describe a secure low-cost alternative that is
slightly more involved. We require each device to have a
unique device identifier at initialisation time, e.g., a serial
number with a unique vendor id. For every encryption, a
running counter is increased, so that the combination of this
unique public value and the running counter is unique in
the network. Hence, even if a key is shared between two
devices, the initialisation vector remains unique. Practically,
this combination can be a simple concatenation: if the serial
number and the counter have 64 bit, they match the block-
size of AES. For an HSM that can run 10M encryptions
per second, it would take about 60’000 years to repeat a
counter. In terms of the soundness of our deduction rules,
any other way of combining those is sound, as long as it
provides an injective mapping into the set of initialisation
vectors (or is indistinguishable from one).
Authentication of handles: The third novelty to our
policy is the authentication of handles. Usually, handles
are assigned through a running counter or are simply the
memory address where the key is physically stored. If a key
is exported to another device, it most likely receives a new
handle. Instead, we chose a unique handle at key-generation
time, and ensure that, no matter on which device, this handle
always resolves to the same key. We call this property handle
integrity.
We discus the relevant parts of PKCS#11 in the follow-
up. Table 1 gives an overview, see [33, Table 30] for the
full list.
3.1. Object-management
The main security goal is to keep keys secret from the
possibly malicious host. Hence, for the operation of the
device, we disallow direct key imports via C CreateObject.
Nevertheless, in order to import keys via C UnwrapKey, at
least one key must be shared initially. A common practice
is to have the security officer (SO) set up shared keys using
C CreateObject. Thus this function may only be used by the
SO, which we assume happens only during setup or in an
otherwise safe environment and only with trusted PKCS#11
tokens, i.e., tokens implementing our policy by vendors that
guarantee the uniqueness of their unique device identifiers.
As the key-hierarchy is static, so are the attributes. We
thus disable the function C SetAttributeValue altogether.
We allow the user to inspect the device using functions
like C GetObjectSize and C FindObjects and its siblings. As
the adversary has full control, this information is redundant
to him and w.l.o.g., we omit them from our model. Similar
for C DestroyObject. As our model assumed no limit on space
for storing keys, any attack using it can be transformed into
an attack that does not delete objects.
3.2. Key-management
In our policy, normal users can create new objects via
C GenerateKey, C GenerateKeyPair, C DeriveKey or C UnwrapKey.
C GenerateKey and C GenerateKeyPair create a new symmetric
function description rule comment
Object management functions
C CreateObject creates an object (4) only by SO during setup
C GetObjectSize, C GetAttributeValue gather information about object — not useful to adversary
C FindObjects˚ find objects — not useful to adversary
C CopyObject creates a copy of an object — not useful to adversary (in this configuration)
C DestroyObject destroys an object — not useful to adversary
C SetAttributeValue modifies object’s attribute — forbidden by policy
Key-management functions
C GenerateKey generates a secret key (3) generated with level l and universally unique handle h
C DeriveKey derives a key from a base key (9) base keys and derived keys must have level 2, key-
derivation needs random salt, universally unique handle
h
C GenerateKeyPair generates a public / private key
pair
— always level 2; asymm. wrapping keys permits ‘Trojan
wrapped key attack’, thus not modelled (only key-
usage)
C WrapKey wraps (encrypts) a key (7) wrapping key must have larger level than argument key;
internal IV generation (e.g., like C EncryptMessage);
authenticate level and handle as additional data
C UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a key and
stores it
(8) level and handle of new key have to match additional
authenticated data
Key-usage functions
C Encrypt encrypts single-part data (5) require l “ 2, internal IV generation
C Decrypt decrypts single-part data (6) require l “ 2
message digest, signature, MAC, RNG etc. — require l “ 2, not modelled (only key-usage)
TABLE 1: PKCS#11 operations for object and key management, and corresponding rules in our modelling (cf. Section 5).
or asymmetric key, C DeriveKey derives a new key from an
existing one, and C UnwrapKey decrypts a wrapping, i.e., an
AEAD that was output by C WrapKey, and imports its content.
We thus consider these four functions plus C WrapKey the
key-management core of PKCS#11.
C GenerateKey and C GenerateKeyPair: Keys are gener-
ated and then stored with a level and a universally unique
handle. The level is provided by the user by setting the
attribute parameter CK ATTRIBUTE PTR. The handle can be
chosen randomly from a sufficiently large space or using
any another technique/mechanism for creating universally
unique identifier [35]. This ensures handle integrity without
central coordination. The details of the precise encoding
from levels to CK ATTRIBUTE PTR are not important, but the
token has to enforce that the level is correct encoded. In
general, the level can be represented using a vendor-specific
PKCS#11 attribute that encodes this number in an integer.
If there is a suitable upper bound, these levels can also be
encoded in standard PKCS#11 attributes, e.g., if the bound
is 4, the values of CKA WRAP and CKA ENCRYPT can be used
to encode a binary representation of each level between 1
and 4. As wrapping with asymmetric keys is fundamentally
flawed (asymmetric wrapping keys can be used to inject keys
whose values are known to the attacker [14]), asymmetric
key generation (C GenerateKeyPair) is restricted to keys of
level 2. We hence consider asymmetric encryption keys only
for key-usage.
C DeriveKey creates a new key object from a base key.
As there is no AEAD scheme in the PKCS#11v2.40 crypto-
graphic mechanism specification that can be used for both
wrap/unwrap and key derivation [34, Section 2.11], any key
that may be used for key-derivation has level 2 and may only
be used to derive keys of level 2. Similar to C GenerateKey,
a universally unique handle is created.
C WrapKey creates an authenticated encryption of a key
and includes its level and handle as additional authenticated
data. This makes sure that keys are reimported with precisely
the same attributes. This is not possible with PKCS#11
prior to v2.4, due to the lack of support for AEAD. Note,
however, that, even for v2.4, this requires a modification to
its specification or a new interface: PKCS#11 v2.40 specifies
the initialisation vector to be set from the outside, leading
to the aforementioned two-time pad attack. While an imple-
mentation may very well ignore the supplied IV and choose
it internally, by specification, the function output contains
only the cyphertext, not the IV. This is problematic, as it
means that the interface cannot be easily changed to com-
municate the internally generated IV without breaking back-
wards compatibility. For encryption, the current PKCS#11
v3.00 draft solves this by introducing a new interface for
encryption, C EncryptMessage, specifically to support internal
nonce-generation for AEAD schemes. C EncryptMessage has
an additional parameter that can be used to output the IV.
In the current draft, there is no equivalent for key-wrapping.
We encourage the inclusion of a similar mechanism for key-
wrapping in the base specification and making internal IV
generation the default for authenticated wrapping. Consid-
ering the adaptation of C EncryptMessage, we deem this a
realistic proposal. Moreover, internal nonce-generation is a
FIPS requirement: ‘The probability that the authenticated
encryption function ever [across all instances] will be in-
voked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more)
distinct sets of input data shall be no greater than 232.’ [19,
4]
C UnwrapKey decrypts a wrapping, verifies its authentic-
ity and stores the decryption as a new key. It takes the
following parameters: the handle of the wrapping key, an
attribute template specifying the attributes that the newly
generated object should obtain, and a handle for this newly
generated object. The initialisation vector is supplied as the
mechanism parameter. Our policy is to reject any handle
and any template that do not match the authenticated handle
and level. In contrast to previous policies, it is thus not
possible to reimport a key on the same device under different
handles — there is no need to, as all instances of a key
are guaranteed to have the same attributes. Thread-safe
implementations should thus check if the requested handle
is present on the device before unwrapping, relying on locks
only to synchronize concurrent unwrap, key-generation and
key-derivation actions.
3.3. Key-usage
PKCS#11 supports a variety of functions for creating
message digests, signatures, MACs or random numbers. All
of these operate on payload data, hence, we impose that the
keys must have level 2. We impose no further restrictions
beyond PKCS#11’s standard requirements, e.g., MACs can
only be computed with MACing keys, etc.
For AEAD encryption and decryption specifically, we
require that the authenticated header contains the level l “ 1
(for payload data). This prohibits encryptions to be confused
with wrappings and thus ‘trojan key’ attacks [14], where
unwrapping injects dishonest key material into the store.
The same policy applies to encryption for multi-part data
(C EncryptInit, C EncryptUpdate and C EncryptFinal), how-
ever, our model only covers encryption and decryption for
single-part data.
Similar to prior work [18, 22, 11, 20], we will only
model key-usage functions that could possibly interfere with
key-management, i.e., symmetric encryption and decryption,
as indicated by Clulow’s attack. Keys that do not support
encryption can, by the standard, not be used to create or
import wrappings, and hence do not interact with the key-
management. By our policy, asymmetric encryption falls
into the same category. Extending the model to cover non-
key-management operations is straight-forward, but unlikely
to lead to new insights with respect to the security of
policies.
4. Preliminaries
Our analysis takes place in an abstract model of cryptog-
raphy with an active, Dolev-Yao style adversary. The idea
is that all implementations are considered participants in a
protocol. As the adversary is active and has access to all of
them, he can send arbitrary commands to them and combine
their outputs. This represents a network where all hosts are
under adversarial control.
We analyzed this model with Tamarin [42], a protocol
verifier with support for (stateful) security protocols.
Terms and equational theories. Cryptographic messages
are represented by a term algebra over public names PN ,
fresh names FN and variables V . Let Σ be a signature,
i.e., a set of function symbols, each with an arity. We write
f{n when function symbol f is of arity n, e.g., pair{2 is a
function symbol for pairs. Let Terms be the set of terms built
over Σ, PN , FN and V , e.g., pairpt, t1q P Terms, which we
will abbreviate xt, t1y.
Equality is defined by means of an equational theory E,
i.e., a finite set of equations between terms. E induces a
binary relation “E that is closed under application of func-
tion symbols, bijective renaming of names and substitution
of variables by terms.
Example 1. Our model employs the following equational
theory. Unary function symbols fst and snd model projec-
tion on pairs:
fstpxx, yyq “ x sndpxx, yyq “ y
Hence fstpsndpxx, xy, zyyqq “E y. We use true{0 to model a
constant truth value. We model AEAD using senc{4, which
expects a key, an initialisation vector, some authentication
data and a message. The following equations apply:
sdecpk, iv , h, sencpk, iv , h,mqq “ m
sdecSucpk, iv , h, sencpk, iv , h,mqq “ truepq
getHeaderpsencpk, iv , h,mqq “ h
getIVpsencpk, iv , h,mqq “ iv
We use the two-ary function symbol Y# to model multiset
union. Written in infix notation, the following equations for
associativity and commutativity apply:
xY# py Y# zq “ pxY# yq Y# z xY# y “ py Y# xq
This function symbol is built into Tamarin. We will use it to
model natural numbers. We also include a symbol kdf{2 for
key-derivation, without any equations.
Multiset Rewriting. In the Tamarin protocol prover, the
protocol itself, its state and its behavior are modeled using
a multiset of facts and rewriting rules operating on this set.
The state of the system is a multiset of ground facts G, where
a fact F pt1, ..., tkq of arity k is ground if all k terms t1, ..., tk
are ground. Further, there are predefined fact symbols for
special purposes. The state of the adversary’s knowledge is
encoded using the fact symbol !K. Freshness information
is denoted with the fact symbol Fr and messages on the
network are represented by In and Out. Multiset rewriting
rules are denoted by l r´ a sÑ r, where l is the premise, r
is the conclusion and a labels so-called actions. Linear facts
used in the premise are consumed by the transition rule. An
exclamation mark in front of a fact symbol indicates that
it is persistent and can be consumed arbitrarily often. For
example, freshness Fr is a linear fact, whereas adversarial
knowledge !K is a permanent fact.
Example 2. To express, e.g., a key hierarchy or a counter,
we need to identify natural numbers. We can model them
Outpxq r´ sÑ !Kpxq
Frpx : freshq r´ sÑ !Kpx : freshq
r´ sÑ !Kpx : pubq
!Kpx1q, . . . , !Kpxkq r´ sÑ !Kpfpx1, . . . , xkqq
!Kpxq r´ Kpxq sÑ Inpxq
Figure 2: The set of rules MD.
using Tamarin’s built-in support for multisets: a multiset
with n elements 1 P PN represents n. The following two
rules ensure that terms t for which a fact !Natptq or action
IsNatptq exists are always multisets consisting only of 1 P
PN .
r´ IsNatp1q sÑ!Natp1q (1)
!Natpnq r´ IsNatpnY# 1q sÑ!NatpnY# 1q (2)
Intuitively, we say that a rewriting step is possible if all
facts in l are in the current state S. In the resulting state
all linear facts from l are removed and all facts in r are
added. We will formulate this intuition in the following, but
need some preliminaries first. We use lfacts and pfacts to
denote the linear, respectively, the permanent facts in a set,
set to turn a multiset into a set and mset to turn a set into
a multiset. We mark the multiset equivalents of the subset
relation, set difference and set union with a # superscript,
i.e. Ă#, z# and Y#.
We define a labeled transition relation ÑMĂ G# ˆ
P pGq ˆG#, where G# denotes a multiset of ground facts
and M denotes a set of ground instantiations of multiset
rules, as follows:
l r´ a sÑ r PM lfactsplq Ă# S pfactsplq Ă setpSq
S
setpaqÝÝÝÝÑM pSz#lfactsplqq Y# t r u#
Consider, e.g., the following application of (2):
t !Natp1q u# IsNatp1Y#1qÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ t !Natp1q, !Natp1Y# 1q u#.
Using the labelled transition relation, we can define execu-
tions of some model M as a set of traces:
tpA1, . . . , Anq | DS1, . . . , Sn P G#. H A1ÑM . . . AnÑM Sn
^ @i ‰ j. @x. Si`1z#Si “ tFrpxqu
ùñ Sj`1z#Sj ‰ tFrpxquu
Combining the previous transition with an application
(1), we obtain the trace pIsNatp1q, IsNatp1Y# 1qq. The side
condition ensures that fresh variables are instantiated with
unique fresh names.
Tamarin combines a user-defined set of rules describing
the protocol itself with the builtin adversary rules MD
depicted in Figure 2. They represent a standard Dolev-
Yao attacker who obtains knowledge (!Kq by eavesdropping
on the network (Out), creating fresh names, or by using
public values. This knowledge can be combined by applying
function symbols f{k. Known terms can be sent to the
network.
5. Formal Modelling
We present the multiset rewrite rules used to formalise
the policy described in Section 3 and Table 1.
Devices. At any time, a new device can be introduced to
the network. This device has a fresh identifier dev , and its
device counter is initialised to 1 P PN , representing the
natural number 1. Previous work [11, 18, 29] abstracted
all PKCS#11 devices in the network with a single store.
As we want to tackle the problem of locally generating
network-wide unique IVs, we need to capture the absence
of a secure channel between these devices, and thus model
them individually.
Frpdevq, !Natp1q r´ DCtrIspdev ,1 11q sÑ
!Dpdevq,DCtrpdev , 1q
Each device (!Dpdevq), obtains a fresh identifier
(Frpdevq), which links it to the initial counter value
(DCtrpdev , 1q). The action DCtrIs is used in the lemma
counter mono (cf. Section 6) to refer to this counter and show
each counter is monotonically increasing.
Key-generation. When a new key is created, it is stored
along with its level, a freshly chosen handle and a natural
number l on the store of dev , represented by the fact
!Storepdev , h, k , lq. The rules from Example 2 are part of
our model and ensure that l represents a natural number.
The handle as well as the level of the key are handed out
to the adversary (Outpxh, lyq).
!Dpdevq, !Natplq,Frpkq,Frphq
r´ CreateKph, k , lq,StoreKpdev , h, k , lq sÑ
!Storepdev , h, k , lq,Outpxh, lyq (3)
The action CreateK marks the creation of a key along
with its level and attribute and is referenced by lemma
key int conf to say that keys imported via unwrapping were
honestly generated at an earlier point (i.e., no trojan keys can
exist). StoreK, by contrast, marks that a key is added to the
store, which includes import via unwrap and key-derivation.
A second rule contains additionally !Dpdev 1q in the
premise and !Storepdev 1, h, k , lq in the conclusion and is
used to model a trusted set-up phase where a common key
is established on two devices.
¨ ¨ ¨ , !Dpdev 1q r´ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,StoreKpdev 1, h, k , lq sÑ
¨ ¨ ¨ , !Storepdev 1, h, k , lq (4)
Note that devices only need to produce fresh names
during key-generation. Hence, w.l.o.g., a device without
RNG is represented by an adversary that chooses to never
employ a key-generation rule s.t. dev is instantiated to
this device. Devices without RNG exist and are useful:
lightweight authentication tokens can, e.g., obtain a master
key via a trusted set-up, and subsequently import keys via
unwrapping.
Encryption and decryption of payload data. Encryption
(C Encrypt) expects some payload m and encrypts it with
the authenticated header affirming the level as 1 (payload
data) and, for uniformity, an empty handle value  P PN .
For simplicity, the handle h is not required as an explicit
input – the adversary chooses the appropriate instantiation of
this handle anyway. We set the initialisation vector to iv “
xdev , ctry, which, as we will show, ensures the network-
wide uniqueness of the IV.
!Natpctr Y# 1q, !Dpdevq, !Storepdev , h, k , lq,
DCtrpdev , ctrq, Inpmq
r´ UseKpdev , h, k , lq,DCtrIspdev , ctr Y# 1q, IVpivq sÑ
DCtrpdev , ctr Y# 1q,Outpsencpk , iv , x1, y,mq (5)
As before, DCtrIs records the new counter value
(DCtrpdev , ctrY# 1q) to ensure monotonicity. IV marks the
use of the IV. The lemma uniqueness IV will ensure that
no two instances of this action have the same value, which
is a cryptographic requirement for AEAD schemes. Finally,
UseK marks the use of a key and the handle and level that
was assumed. Lemma key usage will ensure that any key
used was created or imported with exactly this handle and
level.
Decryption (C Decrypt) verifies that the authenticated tag
is x1, y. Let iv “ getIVpcq, t “ getHeaderpcq and m “
sdecpk , iv , t, cq in
!Dpdevq, !Storepdev , h, k , lq, Inpcq
r´ UseKpdev , h, k , lq,Decryptpmq,
IsTruepsdecSucpk , iv , t, cqq,Eqpt, x1, yq sÑ
Outpmq (6)
Again, UseK tracks the use of the key. Decryptpmq will
be used in the lemma origin to state that any knowledge
obtained by the output message m was known by the
adversary before invoking decryption.
We use the action IsTrue to check whether the decryp-
tion was successful: every lemma ϕ presented in the next
section is verified w.r.t. the subset of traces for which the
condition
α ¨¨“ p@ a, i.IsTruepaq@i ùñ a “E truepqq1
holds true. This is achieved by showing α ùñ ϕ on
the entire set of traces. For every trace where the term
sdecSucpk , iv , t, cq is unequal to truepq (modulo E), the
property is trivially true and thus the property is valid iff
α holds for all traces that adhere to the restriction. Tamarin
conveniently allows specifying several so-called restrictions
α, which apply to all lemmas we show in the way just
described.
Key-wrapping. Wrapping proceeds in the same vein. A
key on the device (!Storepdev , hw, kw, lwq) can be used
1. F@i denotes that action F appears at position i in the trace.
to encrypt another key (!Storepdev , he, ke, leq). Again, let
iv “ xdev , ctry.
!Natpctr Y# 1q, !Dpdevq, !Storepdev , hw, kw, lwq,
!Storepdev , he, ke, leq,DCtrpdev , ctrq
r´ UseKpdev , hw, kw, lwq,DCtrIspdev , ctr Y# 1q,
IVpivq,Ltpel, wlq sÑ
DCtrpdev , ctr Y# 1q,Outpsencpkw, iv , xle, hey, keqq (7)
The output sencpkw, iv , xle, hey, keq constitutes the
wrapping of ke under kw with authenticated data xle, hey
that records the previous handle and level of ke on device
dev . Again, UseK, DCtrIs and IV track the state of keys,
counters and the IV iv “ xdev , ctry. Similar to IsTrue, the
action Lt ensures the wrapped key has a lower level than
the wrapping key by imposing another restriction on traces:
for every action Ltpa, bq, there is a1 such that aY# a1 “ b,
i.e., a represents a smaller number than b.
Unwrapping. To unwrap (C UnwrapKey), a device is called
with a handle to a wrapping key (i.e., a key of level ě 3) and
an authenticated encryption c. It decrypts c, and stores the
resulting key along with the authenticated handle and level
for future use (!Storepdev , he, ke, leq). Let iv “ getIVpcq,
t “ xle, hey “ getHeaderpcq and ke “ sdecpk , iv , t, cq in
!Natpleq, !Dpdevq, !Storepdev , h, k , lq, Inpcq
r´ UseKpdev , h, k , lq, ImportKpdev , he, ke, leq,Neqple, 1q,
StoreKpdev , he, ke, leq, IsTruepsdecSucpk , iv , t, cqq sÑ
!Storepdev , he, ke, leq (8)
As before, UseK marks the use of the wrapping key
and StoreK their addition to the store. IsTrue ensures that
sdecSucpk , iv , t, cq “E truepq. ImportK marks that the
key contained in the wrapping has been imported, and not
created. It will be referred to by lemma key int conf (cf.
Section 6) to say that any key imported by wrapping was
once created on some device.
By our deduction soundness result, the cyphertext c in
our model contains the authenticated header and IV in the
clear. Hence it represents the ‘raw’ cyphertext, as well as
the other parameters supplied to C Unwrap.
Key-derivation. Key-derivation (C DeriveKey) is restricted
to key-usage keys, i.e., keys of level 2. Recall that we
omitted pure key-usage like MACs from the model, except
for AEAD encryption and decryption. We therefore model
key-derivation with AEAD base keys to represent derivation
from other keys of level 2. The Fr-facts in the premise
model the generation of a globally unique handle, as well
as a random salt r, which is used to derive the new key as
kdfpk , rq. Let two “ 1Y# 1 in
!Dpdevq, !Storepdev , h, k , twoq,Frprq,Frph 1q
r´ UseKpdev , h, k , twoq,StoreKpdev , h 1, kdfpk , rq, twoq,
CreateKph 1, kdfpk , rq, twoq sÑ
!Storepdev , h 1, kdfpk , rq, twoq (9)
As before, UseK marks the use of the key k . Similar
to key-generation, this rule is marked with StoreK (as the
derived key is added to the store of dev ), as well as CreateK
(as the key kdfpk, rq is created).
6. Results for AES-GCM/CCM
The stated purpose of PKCS#11 is to separate secret data
from untrusted code accessing the interface. Hence our main
goal is to ensure that no key generated on the device can
leak to the adversary. Nevertheless, there are two additional
integrity properties that we consider important, but that have
been largely overlooked by prior work. First, the integrity of
the keys themselves: each key on the device was created on
some (honest) device. Second, the integrity of the mapping
from handles to keys: each key, on whichever device it may
be placed, will always have the same level and the same
handle. The latter property is a new feature of our policy
that is meant to ensure that no attacker can confuse an
honest application into using an insecure or deprecated key
by altering the assignment from handles to keys.
We verify these properties using two helping lemmas
(see Table 2). These lemmas were stated manually, but
proven automatically. The first one (origin), establishes that
any knowledge obtained through decryption was available
beforehand, and that all keys imported via wrapping were
either originally created on some the device, or otherwise
known by the adversary in forehand. The first conjunct of
origin prunes cases where decryption is used to derive a
term of arbitrary form from an encryption. Intuitively, when
Tamarin’s backward search algorithm is trying to prove
that a certain term cannot be deduced, e.g., a key stored
on the device, it considers all rules that have a matching
Out-fact. The rule for decryption (6) by itself could output
any term t, as long a c “ sencpk, iv, x1, y, tq is input,
and thus known to the adversary. This c itself could come
from rule (6), which, without origin, creates a loop. This
conjunct establishes that the content of the cyphertext must
have been known prior to using the decryption rule. As
knowledge facts are permanent, the application of rule (6)
is superfluous, and thus this step can be pruned. The second
conjunct can be used to either establish the freshness of keys
(both rules containing CreateKpkq have the premise Frpkq),
or to pinpoint an earlier leak of a key, which helps in the
inductive steps of many of the follow-up lemmas.
The second helping lemma (counter monotonicity) estab-
lishes that on each device, the counter is monotonically
increasing. Proving it is just a matter of considering all pairs
of rules where the action DCtrIs occurs, but when applied,
it readily entails the relationship between any two counter-
values once their temporal relation can be established.
With these lemmas in place, we first show (key usage),
that all keys that are used by an honest token were put in
the store either by unwrapping (8), by key-derivation (9)
or by key-generation (3); and that the attribute and handle
remain unchanged. Second (key int conf, first conjunct),
if they were created by unwrapping, they were previously
generated by key-generation or derivation with the same
attribute and handle, but possibly on different device. To-
gether, this means that all keys that are used were honestly
generated, and that throughout their use, they are associated
with the same attributes and handle. Third (key int conf,
second conjunct), all keys are confidential: it is not possible
for any key that was created on the device to be deduced by
the adversary. In Tamarin, this is expressed by referring to
the action !K in the message deduction rule for adversarial
output (see Figure 2): the adversary cannot output a key
created on some device. Fourth, whenever a key is added to
the store on any device, it is associated with the same level
and handle.
Finally, the deduction soundness result in the next sec-
tion comes with a proof obligation for the protocol: when-
ever a term sencpk, iv , h,mq is output, the tuple pk, iv , hq
needs to be unique. Lemma uniqueness IV establishes the
stronger property that iv itself is distinct within all such
terms.
All these lemmas can be shown automatically using a
custom heuristic that prioritizes goals relevant to IV genera-
tion. We report the number of proof steps and the verification
time per lemma in Table 2. Both were measured on a 3,1
GHz Intel Core i7 with 16GB RAM. A full proof took about
four minutes. As we present a new policy of PKCS#11 with
new features, we cannot compare the verification time with
previous efforts. The closest work to ours also used Tamarin
and reported a runtime of half an hour on a dedicated
computation server [29].
7. Justifying the symbolic abstraction
Symbolic models in the literature that include symmetric
encryption usually imply authenticity of the cyphertext. In
the cryptographic setting, this is called non-malleability.
They do, however, not account for the choice of the IV.
This is reasonable, as in most cases, this choice is part of
the encryption scheme itself, and not a protocol task. For
the configuration we discussed in the last section, however,
IV generation is part of the protocol itself and hence cannot
be abstracted away.
We thus provide some justification for the equational
theory we use to model AEAD, which was introduced in
Example 1, by showing a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the soundness of the symbolic attacker. As
we will see, we have to impose a condition on the protocol.
Luckily, this condition can be proven to hold using Tamarin.
Formal models rely on an abstract representation of
cryptography for efficient tool support. The relationship
between results in this formal model and the complexity-
theoretic model of cryptography was first established by
Abadi and Rogaway [1] under the name of computational
soundness. Computational soundness says that each attack
that occurs with non-negligible probability in the computa-
tional model is represented in the symbolic model. It thus
ensures that the symbolic model and the semantics of the
protocol calculus are adequate models of the cryptographic
primitives and the behaviour of the protocol parties.
dep. lemma description steps seconds
origin Any messages obtained by decryption were encrypted before and all keys imported via unwrapping
were either created on the device or known to the adversary at some point. p!Dpmq@i ùñ
Dj.!Kpmq@j ^ j ă iq ^ pImportKpdev , h, k , lq@i ùñ pDj.CreateKph, k , lq@i ^ j ă iq _
Dj1.!Kpkq@j1 ^ j1 ă iq.
1597 72
counter mono The device counter is monotonically increasing. DCtrIspd, cq@i^ DCtrIspd, c1q@j ^ i ă j ùñ
Dc1.c1 “E z ` c.
1880 77
uniqueness IV No IV is used twice, no matter on which device. IVptq@i^ IVptq@j ùñ i “ j. 8 16
key usage All keys that are used were created by unwrapping, key-derivation or key-generation.
UseKpd, h, k, lq@i ùñ Dj.StoreKpd, h, k, lq@j ^ j ă i.
78 17
key int conf All keys are created on some device (ImportKpd, h, k, lq@i ùñ Dj.CreateKph, k, lq ^ j ă i)
and are never known ( pCreateKph, k, lq@i^Kpkq@jq).
428 45
key level handle Keys always retain the level and handle they were created with. StoreKpd, h, k, lq@i ^
StoreKpd1, h1, k, l1q@j ùñ l “E l1 ^ h “E h1.
170 21
TABLE 2: Proof lemmas and their dependencies. We use F@i to denote that an action F appears at position i in a trace.
For brevity, unbound variables are to be read as universally quantified.
Rather than extending the existing body of work with
an additional computational soundness result for a small set
of primitives, we opted to extend the deduction soundness
framework [17] by Cortier and Warinschi. The distinguish-
ing feature of this framework is that it allows for the compo-
sition of deduction soundness results for different primitives.
As PKCS#11 covers many different cryptographic primitives
this is a very useful feature. The downside is that deduction
soundness does not guarantee computational soundness. The
research question of defining a composable framework for
computational soundness is still open, thus we opted for ex-
tending of Bo¨hl et. al.’s deduction soundness result [9] at the
expense of a weaker guarantee. Their result includes public
key encryption, secret key encryption, signatures, MACs,
hashes2 and also public data structures. All these primitives
are supported by PKCS#11, and thus it is very attractive
to use this model and be able to reason about higher-level
protocols building on our PKCS#11 configuration.
We extend Bo¨hl et. al.’s result with deterministic authen-
ticated encryption, so we can reason about schemes like
AES-GCM and AES-CCM as supported by PKCS#11. We
can only sketch the result here, and refer to Appendix D and
Appendix E, as well as the long version [5] for the details.
We keep the notation minimal in this section and use Bo¨hl
et. al.’s notation in the appendices.
Cryptographic requirements. We introduce a crypto-
graphic security notion closely related to DAE security [39,
Definition 1], but modified to give the adversary access
to the IV. DAE [39] security is logically equivalent to
AEAD security [37] and formalises the confidentiality and
authenticity for AEAD. Our modification, DAE-N security,
differs from DAE security [39] in that oracles can be called
with arbitrary IVs, as long as they do not repeat.3
2. PKCS#11 supports a SHA-1-based key-derivation mechanism.
3. DAE-N security can also be seen as a weaker version of Rogaway’s
notion of misuse-resistant AE (MRAE) security [39, Definition 5]. GCM
and CCM mode provide AEAD security and thus DAE-N security, but not
MRAE security. If used appropriately, SIV mode provides both MRAE and
DAE-N security.
Definition 1 (Deterministic Authenticated Encryption with
IVs). Let Π “ pGen,Enc,Decq be an IV-based authen-
ticated encryption scheme that can handle an associated
header. That means: Given IV space S, associated data
space HAD and message M, the encryption algorithm Enc
takes as input a key k $ÐÝ Genp1ηq, an IV n P S, a string
of associated data H , with H P HAD and a message m
with m P M. It returns a cyphertext c “ Encpk, n,H,mq
with c PM. Decryption takes a key k $ÐÝ Genp1ηq, an IV
n P S, a string of associated data H , with H P HAD and
a cyphertext c with c PM as input and returns m with m
PMY tKu.
The DAE-N-advantage of an attacker A with access to
two oracles (the first called left-hand, the second called
right-hand) in Π is defined
Advdae´nΠ pAq “ PrrAO
Enc
k p¨,¨,¨q,ODeck p¨,¨,¨q “ 1s
´ PrrA$p¨,¨,¨q,Kp¨,¨,¨q “ 1s
where k $ÐÝ Genp1ηq and OEnck p¨, ¨, ¨q and ODeck p¨, ¨, ¨q
denote an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle, re-
spectively. Further, let $p¨, ¨, ¨q be an algorithm returning a
random bitstring c with c PM and Kp¨, ¨, ¨q an algorithm
always returning K.
The adversary may not repeat an IV in a left-query
and may not ask a right-query pH, IV, Y q if some previous
left-query pH, IV,Xq returned Y . (MRAE security defines
Advmrae just the same, but restricts the adversary to not
repeat a left-query and may not ask a right-query pH, IV, Y q
if some previous left-query pH, IV,Xq returned Y .)
A scheme Π is DAE-N secure iff, for all ppt algorithms
A,
Advdae´nΠ pAq ď neglpηq
for a negligible function neglpq and a security parameter
η.
AEAD security [38] has been proven for CCM by
Jonnson [24] and for GCM by McGrew and Viega [31].
In Appendix A, we show that this implies DAE-N security
with little modification.
Symbolic model and deduction relation. We represent the
equations in Example 1 in the deduction soundness frame-
work as a typed symbolic model and deduction relation $
between a set of terms the adversary knows, and a term the
adversary can deduce from this set. A term is deducible
if it can be constructed from other deducible terms or
obtained by applying decryption and similar operations. In
our case, the symbolic model consists of a two randomized
function klc and k
l
h, representing AEAD key generation, an
encryption function E with four arguments, and a function
conS that transforms terms into IVs. The superscript l marks
kc and kh as randomized, as opposed to E and conS which
are deterministic. Both kc and kh are implemented in an
identical way, but different symbols are used to mark keys
that may be corrupted initially, and keys that shall not be
revealed. This is ensured by the protocol conditions below.
We use kx to make statements that hold for both kh and
kc.4
For each l, klx represents a different, randomly chosen
key. The types make sure that the first argument to en-
cryption is always a key and that the second is an IV. The
other two arguments, the authenticated information and the
message, can be arbitrary terms. The deduction relation is
defined by the following four rules:
klxpq conSpnq H m
Epklxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
Epklxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
conSpnq
Epklxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
H
Epklcpq, conSpnq, H,mq
m
From top left to bottom right, they allow (a) the attacker to
construct encryptions if he knows all inputs, (b) to extract
the IV, (c) to extract the authentication information and (d)
to deduce the message if the key may be corrupted initially.
The protocol conditions in the following paragraph ensure
that the adversary only learns keys that are initially cor-
rupted, and hence (d) correctly represents the first equation
in Example 1, as w.l.o.g., the symbolic adversary corrupts
all keys klc from the start.
Implementation. An implementation consist of a Turing
machine that computes each function symbol, a length func-
tion that for each term predicts the length its corresponding
bitstring has, an interpretation function that defines how
bitstrings are interpreted as terms and a valid predicate that
restricts the operations an attacker can perform. The latter
is used to define protocol conditions. These are necessary
for soundness results that have only standard assumptions
on the cryptographic primitives, as the following example
illustrates. It is well known that IND-CCA security does
not guarantee anything in the presence of key-cycles [3].
Hence soundness can only hold if the deduction soundness
attacker (and thus the protocol) is restricted to not produce
them. Alternatively, stronger notions of security such as key-
dependent message security can be used. There is a trade-
4. There is a similar distinction for E that we gloss over here, but is
explained in detail in Appendix B.
off between protocol conditions and requirements on the
cryptographic algorithms.
In our case, the Turing machine implementation is con-
structed using a DAE-N secure encryption scheme and an
injective function that maps the bitstring representation of
any terms in S into the IV space. For GCM and CCM,
e.g., this can be a simple concatenation if we can guarantee
that all terms in S can be represented in 32 bit. Our result is
parametric in this S. We define the bitstring representation of
an encryption to contain the authenticated information and
the IV in the clear. The length function and the interpretation
function are straight-forward. (See Appendix E for details.)
The validity predicate enforces the following protocol
conditions (paraphrased for simplicity):
1) AEAD keys kl can only occur in the first position of
an E-term or in an initial corruption query.
2) No n in Epkl, conSpnq, H,mq occurs twice for the
same l.
3) Whenever conSptq appears in some term, t P S.
Proof overview. Due to its size (about 15 pages), we
need to refer to the full version [5] for the proof, but will
outline its structure here. We show deduction soundness in a
stepwise proof over four games, starting from the deduction
soundness game. This game is used to state that an adversary
can never generate a bitstring that can be parsed to a term
that he should not be able to deduce according to $. In
this game, the adversary interacts with an oracle that gives
him access to the bitstring representation of terms of his
choice. In the first step, it is shown that terms only collide
with negligible probability. In the second, cyphertexts under
honest keys are replaced with random bitstrings. In the third,
the winning condition is made stricter by adding a rule to
the deduction system that allows the adversary to generate
honest cyphertexts — any adversary that can distinguish
between the deduction soundness game with or without
this rule is able to break the authentication property of the
scheme. In the fourth and final step, it is shown that the
modified deduction system is compatible with Cortier and
Warinschi’s notion of composability.
At this point, the model is not yet suited for key-
wrapping, as keys can only appear at key positions and thus
not be encrypted. Bo¨hl et. al.’s framework handles this in
an additional step. Function symbols carry an annotation
to mark some of their input positions as forgetful; in our
case, the fourth position of E. We show that a forgetful
implementation, i.e., an implementation that substitutes each
input at a forgetful function with a random bitstring of the
same length, is also deduction sound. This allows us to relax
the first condition of the validity predicate:
1) AEAD keys kl can only occur in an initial corruption
query, in the first position of an E-term, or as a subterm
of a forgetful position of a function symbol that we
compose with (but not E itself).
The last disjunct implicitly excludes key-cycles: by compos-
ing our AEAD model and implementation MAEAD with (a
renamed version) of itself, M 1AEAD , keys of MAEAD can
encrypt keys of M 1AEAD , but not vice versa.
Relation to our model. Our model has to make sure that
for all possible traces, all three conditions of the validity
predicate hold. The first condition can be checked syn-
tactically: keys are indeed only output within encryptions
terms, where they occur at position one or four. The only
use at the fourth position is in the rule for key-wrapping.
There, key-cycles are avoided by means of the restriction
Ltpel ,wlq. The lemma key level handle ensures that the
level associated to each key is always the same. We can
hence iteratively apply the compositionality result for all
keys of level 1, 1 ` 1, etc.; the restriction associated to Lt
makes sure that keys in the fourth position are always of
lower level than the key at position one.
As a side-effect, however, the dynamic corruption of en-
cryption keys is not guaranteed to be deduction sound. This
is unfortunate, because the policy we propose implements a
key-hierarchy to limit the potential damage due to wrapping
keys that leak, e.g. due to side-channel attacks or brute-
forcing.
Consequently, we refrained from formalising this prop-
erty, as the soundness of a model that includes dynamic
corruption cannot be guaranteed. There is an existing pro-
posal that permits computational soundness without such
protocol restrictions [6] that applies to a hybrid encryption
scheme based on CBC-mode and an arbitrary MAC [45]. We
leave extending these results and investigating the resistance
against key-leakage to future work.
The second condition requires the protocol to make sure
each IV is only used once per key, for all protocol traces.
This is guaranteed by the lemma uniqueness IV, which can
be verified using Tamarin.
The third restriction can be checked syntactically, if we
fix an implementation of conS . For instance, we can set S
to the set of terms xt1, t2y such that t1 has a suitable type
for device ids, e.g., t0, 1u32 and t2 represents t1, . . . , 232u.
We then define the implementation of conS to decode their
bitstring representation and concatenate them.
Limitations of deduction soundness. We stress that de-
duction soundness is only a necessary criterion for compu-
tational soundness, as it only argues about the term repre-
sentation and the deduction relation, but not the process rep-
resentation. Cortier and Warinschi point out that, in addition
to deduction soundness, a so-called commutation property
is necessary to establish computational soundness [17]. It is
not known how to do this in a modular manner.
Roughly speaking, deduction soundness by itself talks
about secrecy, not integrity. We opted for deduction sound-
ness because of the composability it offers. How to obtain
a composability and computational soundness at the same
time remains an interesting open question but we consider
this question out of the scope of this paper.
8. Results for SIV
As we have pointed out before, user-provided IVs con-
stitute a considerable attack vector. An alternative to gen-
erating IVs internally is to get rid of them altogether. Rog-
dep. lemma steps seconds
origin 2087 103
counter mono 1880 79
uniqueness IV 8 16
key usage 86 18
key int conf 443 46
key level handle 170 22
TABLE 3: Results for SIV mode.
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Figure 3: SIV encryption (left) and decryption (right).
away proposed a construction where the initialisation vector
is synthesised from the authenticated information and the
message using a hash function [40] (see Figure 3).
We can readily apply the deduction soundness result to
SIV mode, if we apply the construction sketched in Figure 4.
As Rogaway showed, this construction can turn SIV
mode into a MRAE secure scheme [40, Section 7], which
implies DAE-N security. Interestingly, the construction ef-
fectively vanishes if either iv or h are always set to the
empty string ε. We can therefore argue about SIV mode by
slightly modifying our model so that the fourth position of
senc{4, i.e., the authenticated information, is always set to
. As concatenation cancels out, SIV by itself is a valid
cryptographic implementation and the existing deduction
soundness result applies. We must still ensure uniqueness
of iv , so we include the device identifier and counter in the
header. Finally, we thus verify all lemmas from Section 6
in 284 seconds overall (see Table 3 for details).
iv h m
SIV
csiv
Figure 4: DAE-N/MRAE secure scheme from SIV mode.
9. Related work
The search for logical attacks on security APIs goes back
to Longley and Rigby [30] and Bond and Anderson [10].
There is a huge body of work specifically on PKCS#11 [11,
15, 18], but there have also been academic proposals for new
APIs [28, 16, 27]. While attacks were often a driving factor,
a lot of effort was directed towards finding configurations
that are secure, i.e., that preserve secrecy of keys.
There are three major approaches to the analysis of
PKCS#11 configurations. The first is using program verifi-
cation techniques, but this was not automated and therefore
has largely been discarded [20, 21]. The second approach is
using security type-checking on the implementation, e.g., C-
code [13] or a domain-specific language [2]. This technique
was used to show secrecy of keys against a Dolev-Yao
attacker, but the type-system needs to be modified to reflect
new cryptographic primitives like AEAD encryption. With
the third approach, adoption of new primitives is easier.
Here, protocol verification techniques are used. Essentially,
the security token is the only participant in a protocol,
and the API-level adversary is represented by the network
attacker. Early results were based on model-checking [18]
and thus limited to a fixed number of keys, but under certain
assumptions, the soundness for an unbounded number of
keys can be established [22]. The high degree of automation
even allows for automated attack reconstruction [11]. More
flexibility can be achieved by using protocol verification
tools in the unbounded model, as existing results for the
soundness of a bounded model do not apply if the API itself
is modified, e.g., by introduction of stronger cryptographic
primitives [29]. To our knowledge, the two most functional
yet secure configurations that were discovered either have
keys that lose functionality on wrapping and reimport-
ing [11] or do not allow to export wrapping keys [11, 29].
In contrast to finding configuration which are secure
against logical attacks, cryptographic security proofs for
Security APIs [27, 12] achieve stronger guarantees, but
have not been automated so far. Even though some results
retain compatibility with PKCS#11 [41], their focus is on
secure design, not identification of secure configurations.
Furthermore, following cryptographic necessity, the pro-
posed design forbids that keys may be used for more than
one purpose, e.g., the keys used for wrapping and encryption
need to be separated by design, in contrast to the policy
identified here. While this is cryptographic good practice,
PKCS#11 policies often provide this functionality to allow
for more flexibility in HSM-based protocols.
The idea of relating symbolic abstractions to crypto-
graphic security notions goes back to Abadi and Rogaway’s
introduction of computational soundness [1]. Various results
established the soundness of symmetric encryption [7], sig-
natures [8], and hash function [23], just to name a few.
A priori, these results do not compose, hence Cortier and
Warinschi proposed deduction soundness [17] as a frame-
work that allows for some amount of composability. Subse-
quent work in this framework covered most cryptographic
primitives present in PKCS#11, including MACs, hashes,
signatures, symmetric and public key encryption [9]. To be
sure that we handle device-internal nonce generation cor-
rectly, we introduce deterministic authenticated encryption
with associated data to this framework.
10. Conclusion
We summarize our suggestions for PKCS#11 version 3.0
and other Security APIs and point out challenges in the
protocol verification approach.
The addition of AEAD schemes to PKCS#11 has shown
great potential for functional and secure key-management
policies. It is vital that HSMs can guarantee network-wide
unique IVs, thus this should be mandated for key-wrapping.
The current interface does not provide this IV in the function
output, which is making a device-internal generation impos-
sible or at least unnecessarily complicated. The attributes
attached to a key should be authenticated with the wrapping,
and AES keys should either be usable for wrapping and
unwrapping, or for encryption and decryption. In contrast
to previous policies, the authenticity of a key’s attribute is
guaranteed and thus both encryption and wrapping keys can
be wrapped. While we proposed this policy for PKCS#11,
it is also compatible with the Key Management Interoper-
ability Protocol (KMIP) [26], an independent standard for
key-management that is also governed by OASIS. KMIP
allows for (but does not default to) authenticating attributes
when exporting and importing keys. It provides support for
the GCM and CCM modes of operation as well as internal
IV generation.
Our approach was based on protocol verification, which
was flexible enough to handle the introduction of new prim-
itives, however, finding the correct equations and protocol
conditions is not easy. Despite the huge body of work
in computational soundness, there was no result that gave
an answer right away. No computational soundness results
covers the range of cryptographic primitives supported by
PKCS#11. While Bo¨hl’s deduction soundness result does,
thanks to its composability, it provides weaker guarantees.
We thus encourage future research to consolidate existing
knowledge on computational soundness and to facilitate the
adoption of new primitives by investigating the composabil-
ity of computationally sound cryptographic primitives.
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Appendix
1. AEAD security implies DAE-N security
We now want to show that for “AE with AD” schemes
that are secure considering privacy and authenticity as de-
fined above, it holds that those schemes are also DAE-N
secure.
Lemma 1 (AEAD security [39, Proposition 8]). Let Π =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) be a authenticated encryption with asso-
ciated data with AD space HAD, IV space N and message
space M[37]. Let A be an adversary with access to two
oracles. Suppose A runs in time unionsq and asks qL queries to
its left oracle, these totaling uL bits, and asks qR queries
to its right oracle, these totaling uR bits. Then there exist
adversaries D and F such that
Advdae´nΠ pAq ď AdvprivΠ pDq ` qR AdvauthΠ pF q
where D runs in time unionsqOpuL ` uRq and asks qL queries
totaling uL bits, and F runs in time unionsq + O(uL`uR), asking
at most qL left-queries and one right-query, these totaling
at most ul ` uR bits.
Proof. This proof is exactly the proof of [39, Proposition 8],
however, instead of the modified syntax for deterministic
authenticity/privacy, the original syntax [37] needs to be
employed, i.e., the oracles take a third input for the IV,
hence Op¨, ¨q is replaced by Op¨, ¨, ¨q for every oracle. Both
definitions restrict the adversary to not query the same IV
twice.
2. Deduction Soundness: Background
Cortier and Warinschi [17] defined the notion of deduc-
tion soundness which was a first step towards a framework,
helping to prove the computational soundness of crypto-
graphic protocols more easily. Bo¨hl et al. [9] extended their
work by getting rid of some prior limitations and adding
more security primitives (like MACs or hashes) to their
framework.
Our contribution, is to extend the work of Bo¨hl et al.
by adding AEAD schemes to the composition theorems. To
achieve this in a more readable way, we will try to use a
very similar notation and writing style.
2.1. Symbolic model. Symbolic models in our sense are
used to represent an abstract and formal environment to
verify the security of cryptographic protocols for specific
security notions in the ”symbolic world”. Extending the
work of Bo¨hl et al. we will adopt their symbolic model
making the extension more easy and increase the readability
of the work.
We define our symbolic model M to be a tuple of the
form M “ pT ,ď,Σ,Dq, where T defines the set of data
types, ď the corresponding sub type relation, Σ the signature
and D defines the deduction system. We will define them
in detail step by step in the following paragraphs.
Data types T and sub type relation ď
We define the symbolic model to have data types T , which
we require
‚ to have a base type J, and
‚ to have a sub type relation ď.
We require ď to be a preorder and that for every τ P T , it
holds that τ ď J (every type τ P T zJ is a sub type of the
base type J).
Signature Σ and variables
Let the signature Σ be a set of function symbols and
corresponding arities, such that each function symbol f has
an arity of the form
arpfq “ τ1 ˆ ...ˆ τn Ñ τ
with n being a natural number (n ě 0) and τ, τi P T for
0 ď i ď n.
For function symbols c with 0 arguments (meaning n = 0),
we call c a constant.
We also refer to τ as the type of the function f (type(f ) =
τ ), with τ ­“ J for all function symbols. The only exception
to this rule are garbage terms of the base type J, called gJ.
Garbage of type τ : We require from our signature to contain
constants gτ , such that for all τ P T , gτ represents the
garbage of type τ . Typically bit-strings produced by an
adversary, which cannot be parsed to a meaningful term,
are associated with garbage terms. Those constants are ran-
domized. Randomization is denoted with labels (see Labels
and randomness) applied to function symbols.
In addition to function symbols, we also define an infinite
set of variables variables where for each variable x P
variables, x is of some type τ P T .
Labels and randomness
For each symbolic model M we fix an infinite set of
labels labels = labelsH Y labelsA where both sets are
disjoint and labelsH denotes an infinite set of honest labels,
while labelsA denotes an infinite set of adversarial labels.
Labels denote randomness, therefore it is essential, that we
distinguish between honest and adversarial labels.
Example 3. t :“ enclhpk,mq with lh P labelsH and
ar(enc) = τkeys ˆJ Ñ τcipher
Example 4. t :“ nlapq with la P labelsA and ar(g) =
τnonce
Example 5. t :“ fpt1, t2q with ar(f ) = τ1 ˆ τ2 Ñ τ
We see one application of an honest, randomized func-
tion in Example 3, whereas we see an adversarial, random-
ized function application in Example 4. In Example 5 we
see an application of an deterministic function.
Set of terms
We define Terms (Σ, T ,ď) := ŤτPT set of terms of type τ ,
where the latter is defined inductively by
t : “
| x
| fpt1, .., tnq
| f lpt1, .., tnq l P labels
where t is a term of type τ , x is a variable of type τ ,
fpt1, .., tnq is an application of a deterministic f P Σ and
f lpt1, .., tnq is an application of a randomized f P Σ For
fpt1, .., tnq and f lpt1, .., tnq , we further require that each
ti is of type τ 1i with τ 1i ď τi and that the arity of f is
arpfq “ τ1 ˆ ...ˆ τn Ñ τ .
We also write Terms instead of Terms (Σ, T ,ď) if M is
clear from the context and also write t “ f lpt1, .., tnq for
general terms (also for deterministic function symbols).
Substitutions
For xi, ti P T and i P t1, .., nu we write δ “ tx1 “
t1, .., xn “ tnu to refer to a substitution with domain
dompδq “ tx1.., xnu. A substitution δ “ tx1 “ t1, .., xn “
tnu is well-typed if for each i P t1, .., nu : ti ď xi. In our
symbolic model we only consider well-typed substitutions.
We write δptq “ tδ for an application of a substitution δ of
a term t.
Deduction systems
Each symbolic model contains a deduction relation $:
2Terms ˆ Terms , which is used to model the capabilities
of a symbolic adversary to retrieve information from terms.
With T $ t we describe the capability of a symbolic
adversary to build t from the set of terms T and say t is
deducible from T . Usually deduction relations are defined
through deduction systems which we formally specify as
follows.
Definition 2. (DEDUCTION SYSTEM). A deduction system
D is a set of rules t1,..,tnt such that
t1, .., tn, t P Terms pΣ, T ,ďq. The deduction relation
$DĎ 2Terms ˆ Terms associated to D is the smallest
relation satisfying:
‚ T $D t for any t P T Ď Terms pΣ, T ,ďq
‚ if T $D t1δ, .., T $D tnδ for some substitution δ and
t1,..,tn
t P D then T $D tδ.
Review of Definition 1 by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9]
Further we require for all deduction systems the rule
glJ
for all glJ P Σ and l P labelsA .
Note that we omit D from $D if D is clear from the
context.
Additional Notes:
‚ For δ being a substitution we say that t1δ,..,tnδtδ is an
instantiation of t1,..,tnt P D
‚ We require deduction relations to be efficiently decid-
able. Knowing this, for T $ t we can always efficiently
find a sequence pi “ T a1ÝÑ T1 a2ÝÑ .. anÝÝÑ Tn such that
for all i P t1, .., nu it holds that:
1) ai “ t1,..,tnt
2) t1, ..tn P Ti´1
3) t1 R Ti´1
4) t1 P Ti
5) t P Tn
We refer to pi as an deduction proof for T $ t.
2.2. Implementation. As well as the symbolic model, we
also redefine the corresponding implementation of Bo¨hl,
Cortier, and Warinschi [9].
We define I as an implementation of a symbolic model
M with I = pMη, J¨Kη, lenη, open η, valid ηqη being a
family of tuples. In the following, we will omit the security
parameter η for readability.
The components of I are defined as follows:
‚ Turing machine M
Provides concrete algorithms for the corresponding
function symbols in the signature of the symbolic mode.
Those algorithms operate on bitstrings.
‚ Mapping function J¨K
The function J¨K : T Ñ 2t0,1u˚ maps each type to a set
of bitstrings.
‚ Length function len
The function len : Terms Ñ N returns for each term
the length of its corresponding bitstring.
‚ Interpretation algorithm open
The algorithm open interprets bitstrings as terms.
‚ The valid predicate
To get computational soundness results we usually have
to restrict the implementation. In our very case, the
valid function takes care of this. The valid function
takes a trace T as an input (we will formally introduce
traces later on in Definition 7) and returns a boolean
value representing the validity of this trace.
Additionally we have the following requirements on the im-
plementation I (to the symbolic model M corresponding).
Requirements:
1) For each τ P T we require JτK Ď t0, 1uη to be
nonempty. For the base type J we require JJK = t0, 1u˚
and that for all τ, τ 1 P T it holds that, if τ ď τ 1 thenJτK Ă Jτ 1K and otherwise JτK X Jτ 1K = H.
Further we define
‚ JT K as ŤτPT {tJuJτK
‚ xc1, .., cn, τy as a bijective function that encodes
c1, .., cn to c1 with c1 P JτK.
2) The Turing Machine M is required to be determinis-
tic, but has a random tape R provided at each run.
Precisely, we require for each f P Σ which is not a
garbage symbol and has arity arpfq :“ τ1ˆ ..ˆ τn Ñ
τ , that M calculates a function pMfq on input f . The
domain of pMfq should be Jτ1K ˆ .. ˆ JτnK ˆ t0, 1u˚
and the range JτK.
To generate a bitstring for a term t “ f lpt1, .., tnq
we apply pMfq to the bitstrings of the subterms ti of
t and use some randomness (except for deterministic
function symbols). The recursively resulting bitstringJtK is called concrete interpretation of t.
Interpretations
In cryptographical applications, it occurs that the same
random values occur multiple times within the same term,
for instance, if a random nonce appears multiple times
in an encryption. To deal with such occurrences within
our interpretation, we will use a partially defined mapping
L :t0, 1u˚ Ñ HTerms from arbitrary bitstrings to so-called
Hybrid Terms, which acts as a library.
Hybrid Terms are either garbage terms or t “
f lpc1, .., cnq where f P Σ with arpfq :“ τ1 ˆ .. ˆ τn Ñ τ
and ci PJτiK for i Pt1, .., nu . The domain of L dompLq Ď
2t0,1u˚ is the set of bitstrings for which L is already
defined. The interpretation of bitstrings c P dompLq with
respect to L is defined as LJcK:“ f lp LJc1K, ..,LJcnK q
if Lpcq “ f lpc1, .., cnq and LJcK:“ Lpcq for Lpcq be-
ing a garbage term. A complete mapping is given, if
@pc, f lpc1, .., cnqq P L : c1, .., cn P dompLq. Generating
function
In the following we will define a generate function using a
mapping L introduced in section B.2. This generate function
takes a term t = f lpt1, .., tnq as input and produces a
bitstring c corresponding to t.
To produce c, the Turing machine M has to use the ran-
dom tape R as a source of randomness, using an algorithm
Rptq : Terms Ñ t0, 1uη which produces a different random
bitstring r depending on a term t P Terms .
Listing 1: generate
generateM,Rpt, Lq:
if for some c P dompLq we have LJcK ““ t then
return pc, Lq
else
for i P t1, ..., nu do
let pci, Lq :“ generateM,Rpti, Lq
let r :“ Rptq
let c :“ pMfqpc1, ..., cn; rq
let Lpcq :“ f lpa1, ..., anqqpl P labesHq
return pc, Lq
Additional notes:
‚ generate also updates L.
‚ generate depends on M and R, but we will omit them
if they are clear from the context.
‚ If L is complete, it holds that for all terms t P Terms
with t “f lpt1, .., tnq and pc, L1q :“ generate pt, Lq,
L1 is also complete.
‚ For all subterms t1 “f lpt1, .., tnq of t where l P
labelsA , there is a c P dompLq with LJcK “ t1
‚ There is no t2 being a subterm of t, s.t. t2 “ glpq and
l P labelsH .
The last point ensures that all bitstrings generated by the
generate function only contain non-garbage function ap-
plications where the function symbols carry an honest label
l P labelsH .
Parsing function
In addition to the generate function which produces bit-
strings from terms, we require from the implementation the
definition of a function which produces terms from bitstrings.
The function takes a bitstring c and a mapping L as input
and returns a term t P Terms and an updated mapping L1.
Since the function depends on the open : t0, 1u˚ ˆ
libsÑ{0, 1}˚ˆHTerms function provided by an concrete
implementation, we have to omit an exact definition of parse
but require the following structure:
Listing 2: parse
parsepc, Lq:
if c P dompLq then
return pLJcK, Lq
else
let Lh :“ tpc, f lp...qq P L|l P labelsH u
let L :“ pŤpc,¨qPL open pc, Lhqq
let G :“ tpc, glpcqJ qu pl P labelsH q
while G ­“ H do
let L :“ pLzGq Y pŤpc,¨qPG open pc, Lhqq
let G :“ tpc, glpcqJ q|pc, f lp.., c, ..qq P L^ c P dompLq
return pLJcK, Lq
Additional notes:
‚ has to provide a concrete context such that different
open functions can be composed
‚ open is only allowed to use honestly generated bit-
strings
‚ Foreign bitstrings, meaning bitstrings of a data type
which is not part of the implementation, are ignored
by open
‚ open functions are commutative due to the properties
stated above, which is important for the composition
theorems in F in the full version [5].
Good implementation
Starting in this section we will describe several require-
ments and restrictions towards the behavior of an imple-
mentation. The term good implementation refers to those
implementations which satisfy all properties defined in this
section.
Length regularity
We require that lenpf lpt1, ..., tnqq :“
|pMfqpc1, ..., cn, rq| only depends on the length of ci.
Such a length function len is equivalent to a set of length
functions lenf : Nn Ñ N for each function symbol f P Σ
with arpfq :“ τ1 ˆ ... ˆ τn Ñ τ . This equivalence is
needed to be able to compose length functions of different
implementations as described in Section B.4.
Collision freeness
Problems occur if values in the mapping L are over-
written. Assume a bitstring c P dompLq is then parsed to a
term t1 instead of the intended term t. This could prevent an
adversary from winning the deduction soundness game, so
a good implementation should be collision free. To define
what collision freeness means we also need to introduce the
notion of a supplementary transparent function to model
the capability of an adversary to choose arbitrary bitstrings
for arguments of type J. This is needed since transparent
implementations also need to be collision free, because we
want them to be composable, too.
In Definition 3 we introduce the mentioned supplementary
transparent functions and in Definition 4 we finally introduce
the notion of collision freeness.
Definition 3. Supplementary transparent functions
For a set of bitstrings B Ă t0, 1u˚ we define the transparent
model MtransupppBq as follows:
‚ T transupp :“ tJ, τ transuppu. τ transupp is a subtype of J.
‚ Σtransupp :“ tfc : c P Bu (all function symbols are
deterministic)
‚ Dtransupp :“ t fcpq : c P Bu
and an implementation ItransupppBq as follows:
‚ Jτ transuppK :“ B
‚ pM transuppfcqpq returns c
‚ pM transuppfuncqpcq returns fc if c P B, K otherwise
(Review of Definition 2 by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
Definition 4. Collision-free implementation
Let DS1M,I,Apηq be the deduction soundness game from
Listing 5 where we replace the generate function by the
function generate’ from Listing 1. We say an implementa-
tion I is collision free if for all p.p.t. adversaries A
PrrDSMYMtransupppJT Kq,IYItransupppJT Kq,Apηq “ 1s
´PrrDS1MYMtransupppJT Kq,IYItransupppJT Kq,Apηq “ 1s
is negligible.
(Review of Definition 3 by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
Type safety
We define type safety in the following sense
Definition 5. Type safe implementation
We say that an implementation I of a symbolic model M
is type safe if
piq openpc, Lq “ pc, glJq for l P labelsA if c R JT K.piiq openpc, Lq “ openpc, L|JT Kq where L| JT K :“
tpc, hq P L : Dτ P T ztJu : c P JτKu.
(Review of Definition 4 by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
Intuitively, piq states that open should not work on foreign
bitstrings and only return garbage of type J, while piiq
states that the behavior of the open function is not altered
by any foreign bitstring in L. This guarantees that composed
open functions do not interfere with each other, meaning
they do not work on each others bitstrings.
Since we demand to run in polynomial time in size of the
mapping L, we therefore demand a reasonable run time for
open (since is based on open ). valid requirements
Before we can start to define our requirements on the valid
function, we will now introduce the notions of queries and
traces.
Definition 6. Query
Queries in our case are requests sent by the adversary to
the deduction soundness game (or any variation of it). A
query q is either ”generate t”, ”sgenerate t”, ”c” or
”init T,H”.
Definition 7. Trace
We define a trace T as a time ordered list of queries T :“
q1 ` q2 ` ...` qn
Knowing this, we now state the requirements on valid
which we need to be able to compose valid functions later
on.
piq If valid(T ` q) = true then for any variation qˆ
of q, which we define explicitly below, it holds that
valid(T` qˆ) = true.
If q = ”generate t” and qˆ = ”generate tˆ”:
Here, a variation tˆ of t is defined as follows: Any
subterm f lpt1, ..., tnq of t where f is a foreign function
symbol, i.e. f R Σ, can be replaced by fˆ lˆptˆ1, ..., tˆnq
where fˆ is another foreign function symbol and for all
i P t1, ..., nu tˆi is either tj for some j P t1, ..., nu
(where each tj only can be used once) or tˆi does not
contain any function symbols from Σ. As a special
case, if for example fˆ is ”empty”, we may replace
f lpt1, ..., tnq with a term tˆ1.
If q = ”init T,H” and qˆ = ”init Tˆ , Hˆ”:
T “ pt1, ..., tnq and Tˆ “ ptˆ1, ..., tˆnq where for each i P
t1, ..., nu tˆi is a variation of ti; and H “ ph1, ..., hmq
and Hˆ “ phˆ1, ..., hˆmq where for each i P t1, ...,mu hˆi
is a variation of hi.
piiq We demand that, if valid(T ` q) = true and term
t P q, then for any t P stptq it holds that valid(T`
”sgenerate t1”) = true.
piiiq The run time of valid(T) should be polynomial and
should only depend on T.
To conclude: If an implementation I is length regular,
collision free, type safe and if the requirements on valid
hold, we call I a good implementation.
2.3. Transparent functions. To conclude the idea from Def-
inition 3, we will now start to formally define the notion of
transparent functions (and also transparent symbolic models
and transparent implementations). We need those notions,
because we want to achieve our soundness results in the
presence of any public data structure, for instance: tuples,
arrays, XML files etc. We call those public data structures
transparent functions and will define transparent symbolic
models and transparent implementations using such func-
tions in the following.
Transparent symbolic models:
A transparent symbolic model Mtran “ pTtran,ďtran
,Σtran,Dtranq is defined similar to the symbolic model from
B.1 but having a specific definition of the deduction system
Dtran stated below:$’’’’&’’’’%
t1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tn
f lpt1, ¨ ¨ ¨, tnq l P labelsA, f P Σtran
f lpt1, ¨ ¨ ¨, tnq
ti
1 ď i ď n, l P labelsA, f P Σtran
,////.////-
Transparent implementations:
A transparent implementation Itran “
pMtran, J¨Ktran, lentran, opentran, validtranq of a symbolic
model is also an implementation, meaning it meets the
same requirements as in B.2. For the Turing machine
Mtran we require two additional modes of operations:
func and proj. We define them right below:
For all function symbols f P Σ with arity ar(f ) =
τ1 ˆ ...ˆ τn Ñ τ we define
pMtran funcq : t0, 1u˚ Ñ ΣY tKu
pMtran prod f iq : t0, 1u˚ Ñ t0, 1u˚
such that for all ci P JτiK with 1 ď i ď n and r P t0, 1uη
pMtran funcqppMtran fqpc1, ..., cn; rqq “ f
pMtran prod f iqppMtran fqpc1, ..., cn; rqq “ ci
and require that pMtran funcq “ K for all c R JT K. We
also require that pMtran funcq and pMtran prod f iq both
run in polynomial time (depending on η).
The bitstring mapping J¨Ktran as well as the length function
lentran are not defined any different as in B.2. The open
function opentran on the other hand is defined explicitly
below:
Listing 3: opentran
opentran(c, L)
if c P JT K X dom(L) then
return (c, L(c))
else if pMtran funcqpcq ““ K then
find unique τ P T s.t. c P JτK and c R Jτ 1K
for all τ 1 P T with Jτ 1K Ĺ JτK
return pc, glpcqτ q plpcq P labelsAq
else
let f :“ pMtran funcqpcq with
ar(f ) = τ1 ˆ ...ˆ τn Ñ τ
if pMtran prod f iq ““ K
for any i P r1, ns then
return pc, glpcqτ q plpcq P labelsAq
else
for i “ 1 to n do
let ci :“ pMtran prod f iqpcq
return pc, f lpcqpc1, ..., cnqqplpcq P labelsAq
With this function, we can easily show that the implemen-
tation is type safe by using the two properties required by
Definition 5. The first property is already required above
(see func) and the second property holds because L is not
used by the opentran function.
Also transparent functions are not restricted in any way so
we define validtranpTq = true for all possible traces T.
2.4. Composition. In this we will explain how to compose
two symbolic models M1 “ pT1,ď1,Σ1, D2q and M2 “
pT2,ď2,Σ2, D2q and there corresponding implementations
I1 and I2 in a general way.
We define the composition of M1 and M2 as
M1 “ pT1 Y T2,ď1 Y ď2,Σ1 Y Σ2, D1 YD2q
if
1) Σ1 X Σ2 “ tgJu
2) T1 X T2 “ tJu
To compose two implementations I1 and I2 we require that
iq for all τ1 P T1ztJu, τ2 P T2ztJu we have Jτ1KXJτ2K “
H
iiq and further that I 1 = I1YI2 is a good implementation
of M1.
To fulfill requirement iiq we now start to define I 1 :“
I1 Y I2. The Turing machine M 1 “ M1 Y M2 returns
pM 1fq :“ pM1fq if f P Σ1 or pM 1fq :“ pM2fq otherwise.
For all τ P T1 we set JτK1 :“ JτK1 and for all τ P T2 we setJτK1 :“ JτK2. Further we require all JJK1 “ JJK1 “ JJK2 “
t0, 1u˚
As we saw in section B.2, the length functions are easy
composable. We have len1 :“ lenf1 : NN Ñ N with
f1 P Σ1 and len2 :“ lenf2 : NN Ñ N with f2 P Σ2.
We simply define len1 :“ len1 Y len2.
We define the composition of the open function in the
following way:
Listing 4: open1
popen1 ˝ open2qpc, Lq:
let pc, tq :“ open1pc, Lq
if t “ glJ for some l P labelsA then
return open2pc, Lq
else
return pc, tq
Therefore we have open’ :“ open1 ˝ open2.
From the valid predicate valid’, we demand both
valid1 and valid2 to remain valid, so we write
valid1pTq :“ valid1pTq ^ valid2pTq.
After defining the composition I 1 “
pM 1, J¨K1, len1, open1, valid1q we need to show that I 1
is a good implementation B.2 of M1.
Type safety holds since T1 X T2 “ tJu is given by
requirement (2.) of composing symbolic models. This implies
that JT1K1 X JT2K1 “ JJK1 and since we have I1 and I2
being type safe and open1 ˝ open2 “ open2 ˝ open1 we can
easily conclude that I 1 is also type safe (see B.2 for concrete
requirements).
Length regularity is automatically given for len1 since
Σ1 X Σ2 “ tg1Ju leads to len1 X len2 “ H.
Hence, for any input f P Σ1 len1pf lpt1, ..., tnqq returns
len1pf lpt1, ..., tnqq, what is length regular by assumption,
and returns len2pf lpt1, ..., tnqq for f P Σ2 otherwise, what
is naturally also length regular by assumption.
The valid requirements are fulfilled by valid’ by construc-
tion since both valid1 and valid2 must hold for valid’ to
hold.
Collision freeness is the second requirement for composing
implementations as well as one of the requirements of a
good implementation. As a strategy to show that I 1 is colli-
sion free we show that additional requirements for valid1
and valid2 hold. Those requirements are concretized in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let M1,M2 be symbolic models with im-
plementations I1 and I2, respectively. If in addition to
requirements (1.),(2.) [of the symbolic model composition]
and iq [of the implementation composition] the following
requirements for valid1pTq :“ valid1pTq ^ valid2pTq
hold:
1) Let Tˆ be T with all silent generate ”sgenerate t”
replaced with normal generate queries ”generate t”.
Then valid1pTq ñ valid1pTˆq.
2) Let x P t1, 2u. If validx(”init T,H”), then for each
t P T YH all function symbols in t are from Σx or no
function symbol in t is from Σx.
3) Let x P t1, 2u. Let Tˆ be an expansion of pi “ q1`...`qn
in the following sense: A qi = ”generate t” for
i P t1, ..., nu is replaced with q1i , ..., qmi where qji =
”sgenerate tj , tj P stptq and tj does not contain
function symbols from Σx for j P t1, ...,mu. Then
valid1xpTq ñ valid1xpTˆq.
then pM1, I1q and pM2, I2q are compatible.
Review of Lemma 1 by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9].
Proof. One can prove Lemma 2 by a sequence of
games. First one would show that there is no ad-
versary A who can distinguish whether he plays
DS1M1YMtransupppJT 1Kq,I1YItransupppJT 1Kq,Apηq or the same game in
which the generate’ function is modified with
if c P dompLq X JT1K then
exit game with return value 1 (collisi on)
instead of
if c P dompLq then
exit game with return value 1 (collisi on)
After showing that the games described above are indistin-
guishable, one shows that the latter game is indistinguishable
from the original DS game.
Using Definition 4, the indistinguishability of the games
described above suffices to proof that I 1 is collision free.
(For the full proof see Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
2.5. Deduction soundness. Finally, in this section we will
recall the notion of deduction soundness [9]. We define
deduction soundness with the help of a game, the DS game
(see Listing 5).
To explain deduction soundness, we first will introduce the
notion of a parameterized transparent symbolic model and
its corresponding parameterized transparent implementation
and then continue with explaining the idea behind the DS
game.
Definition 8. (Parameterization)
A mapping Mtranpνq from a bitstring ν to a transparent
symbolic model Mtran is called a parameterized transpar-
ent symbolic model. Respectively, we define a parameterized
transparent implementation Itranpνq as mapping from the
bitstring ν to a transparent implementation Itran. Further,
Itranpνq is an implementation of Mtran and the length(ν)
¡ length(p(η)) where p is a polynomial function.
We also define ν to be good, if Itranpνq is a good imple-
mentation (see section B.2) of Mtranpνq.
The DS game is defined 1q between a challenger and
an adversary A 2q to show that I is a deduction sound
implementation of M, where Mpνq :“ M YMtran and
Ipνq :“ I Y Itran.
1) The challenger keeps a set of requested terms S, a map-
ping L and a trace of queries T, while the adversary
provides a parameter ν.
At first, with an ”init T,H” query, bitstrings corre-
sponding to a set of terms T and a set of hidden terms
H are generated. Then the adversary has the possibility
to parse bitstrings to terms and to generate bitstrings
from terms, while the valid predicate must always
hold on T during the game or the adversary losses
(return 0). On the other hand, the adversary wins the
DS game, if he is able to create a bitstring which can
be parsed, but is not deducible from S (which would
be a non-Dolev-Yao term).
2) Deduction soundness of an implementation I with
respect to a symbolic model M is illustrated in the
following Definition.
Listing 5: Deduction Soundness game
DSMpνq,Ipνq,A(η):
Let S := H
Let L := H
Lat T := H
R Ð t0, 1u˚
Receive parameter ν from A
on request "init T,H" do
add "init T " to T
if validpTq then
let S := S Y T
let C := H
for each t P T do
let pc, Lq := generatept, Lq
let C := C Y tcu
for each t P H do
let pc, Lq :“ generatept, Lq
send C to A
else
return 0 (A is invalid)
on request "sgenerate t" do
if validpT` ”sgenerate t”q then
let pc, Lq :“ generatept, Lq
on request "generate t" do
add "generate t" to T
if validpTq then
let S := S Y ttu
let pc, Lq :“ generatept, Lq
send c to A
else
return 0 (A is invalid)
on request "parse c" do
let pt, Lq := parsepc, Lq
if S $D t then
send t to A
else
return 1 (A produced a non-DY term)
Definition 9. (Deduction Soundness)
Let M be a symbolic model and I be an implementation
of M. We call I a deduction sound implementation of
M, if for all parameterized transparent symbolic models
Mtranpνq and for all parameterized transparent implemen-
tations Itranpνq of Mtran that are composable with M and
I (see requirements from section B.4) we have
PrrDSMYMtranpνq,IYItranpνq,Apηq “ 1s
to be negligible for all probabilistic polynomial time ad-
versaries A sending only good parameters ν where DS
is the deduction soundness game from Listing 5. Note
that M Y Mtranpνq can be generically composed to a
parameterized symbolic model M1pνq and parameterized
implementation I 1pνq, respectively.
(Review of Definition 5 Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
Intuitively, we call an implementation I deduction sound
with respect to its corresponding symbolic model M, if
the deduction relation $D reflects all capabilities of the
computational adversary. Concretely, this means that no
adversary can produce, given a set of terms S, a bitstrings
c corresponding to a term t with S & t.
Additionally, since the DS game does not prevent col-
lisions, we naturally want to show that no adversary can
produce those collisions with an overwhelming probability.
Since only generate function calls can produce collisions
by producing a bitstring which is already in L (the structure
of the function on the other hand prevents collisions), it
suffices to show that the following lemma 3 holds, which is
already proven by Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9].
Lemma 3. Let DS
1
Mpνq,Ipνq,A(η) be the deduction sound-
ness game where we replace the generate function by the
collision aware generate function ( see Figure 3 [9]). Then
no p.p.t. adversary A can distinguish DSMpνq,Ipνq,A(η)
from DS
1
Mpνq,Ipνq,A(η) with non-negligible probability.
(Note that the transparent functions are already included
Mpνq and Ipνq in here.)
(Review of Lemma 2 Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9])
3. Deduction soundness of AEAD schemes
The advantage of deduction soundness is that it is rel-
atively easy to extend. Bo¨hl, Cortier, and Warinschi [9]
already added public datastructures, public key encryption,
signatures, secret key encryption, MACs and hashes to their
framework. Our contribution to this will be, to extend the
framework with authenticated encryption schemes with as-
sociated data.
We will define a symbolic model MAEAD and a correspond-
ing implementation IAEAD. Then we will show that for any
symbolic model M which is composable with MAEAD (see
Section B.4 in the full version [5] ) and implementation
I where I is a deduction sound implementation of M, it
holds that the composition IYIAEAD is a deduction sound
implementation of M YMAEAD if I is composable with
IAEAD.
To achieve this, we will use the notion of DAE-N security
(Definition 1) and rewrite the definition in a game-like way
to fit into the syntax of our computational model.
Listing 6: DAE-N game
DAE -N(Gen, Enc, Dec)A (η):
b
$ÐÝ t0, 1u
oracles := H
on request "new oracle" do
let r
$ÐÝ t0, 1uη
let k := Gen(1η, r)
oracles.add(k)
let ciphersk := H
send k to A
on request "OEnck pn,H,mq" do
if k R oracles then
send K to A
else
if b == 0 then
let c’:= Enck(n, H, m)
let c
$ÐÝ t0, 1u|c1|
ciphersk.add((c, m))
send c to A
else
send Enck(n, H, m) to A
on request "ODeck pn,H, cq" do
if k R oracles then
send K to A
else
if b == 0 then
if (c, m) P ciphersk
for some m
then
send m to A
else
send K to A
else
send Deck(n, H, m) to A
on request "guess b’" do
if b == b’ then
return 1
else
return 0
Intuitively, the adversary A which now plays DAE-N game
still tries to distinguish whether he interacts with real ora-
cles or with some fake oracles. Concretely, a bit b is chosen
at random in the beginning of the game, which decides
whether the adversary gets a response from a real oracle
(if b = 1) or from a fake oracle (if b = 0). If the adversary
is able to send a request ”guess b1” (and b1 ““ b) with a
probability significantly higher than 12 , he can break DAE-N
security of the encryption scheme. Note that we additionally
added a random input parameter r to the key generation
algorithm to clarify that all oracles use a different source
of randomness.
4. Symbolic model
At first we define the symbolic model MAEAD “
pTAEAD,ďAEAD,ΣAEAD,DAEADq:
Signature ΣAEAD:.
kx : τ
kx
AEAD
conS : J Ñ τnAEAD
Ex : τ
kx
AEAD ˆ τnAEAD ˆJˆJ Ñ τ cipherAEAD
are the featured function symbols, with x P th, cu and S
being a set of possible nonces.
The randomized function kh returns honest keys while kc
returns corrupted keys.
The deterministic function conS maps an arbitrary input
value to a nonce from the set S.
The deterministic function Eh returns an honest cyphertext
using an honest key, a nonce, and two additional arbitrary
values as input.
The only difference of Ec to Eh is that Ec uses some
corrupted key as input and returns a corrupted cyphertext.
Set of types TAEAD.
TAEAD “ tJ, τkxAEAD, τnAEAD, τ cipherAEADu
Sub type relation ďAEAD. All types introduced above are
direct sub types of the base type J.
Deduction System DAEAD:.
klxpq conSpnq H m
Exp klxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
Exp klxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
conSpnq
Exp klxpq, conSpnq, H,mq
H
Ecp klcpq, conSpnq, H,mq
m
5. Implementation
We now define a concrete implementation IAEAD “
pMAEAD, J¨KAEAD, lenAEAD, openAEAD, validAEADq
for authenticated encryption scheme with associated data.
The implementation uses some DAE-N secure authenticated
secret key encryption scheme ΠDAEN “ pDAEN.Gen,
DAEN.Enc,DAEN.Decq. ΠDAEN additionally is
collision free by construction since a collision would break
the authenticity of the encryption scheme. We fix a set of
bitstrings S1 Ă t0, 1u˚, which we will later require to
correspond to a specified set of terms used to derive IVs.
We also fix an arbitrary injective and efficiently computable
function ι : S1 Ñ JτNAEADK. We can now define the model
and implementation as follows:
Turing machine MAEAD. Now we will give the compu-
tational interpretations of the function symbols defined in
D.
‚ (MAEAD kxqprq: Let k := DAEN.Genp1η, rq.
Return xk, τkxAEADy
‚ (MAEAD conqpnq: Return xιpnq, τnAEADy
‚ pMAEADExqpkˆ, nˆ1, H,mq: Parse kˆ as xkxτkxAEADy.
Parse nˆ as xn1, τnAEADy.
Let c :“ DAEN.Enckpn1, H,mq
Let Hˆ :“ xH,Jy Return xc, nˆ1, Hˆ, k, τ cipherAEADy
are the computational interpretations of kx, con and Ex,
respectively.
The mapping function J¨KAEAD. The mapping functionJ¨KAEAD : T Ñ 2t0,1u˚ is a function which maps each
type τ P T to a set of bitstrings. J¨KAEAD should fulfill
all conditions stated in B.2 in the full version [5]. Namely,
we demand from our concrete implementation that JJK =
t0, 1u˚ and for each x P tτkxAEAD, τnAEAD, τ cipherAEADu thatJxK Ă t0, 1uη. Further, we demand that for all x, y P
tτkxAEAD, τnAEAD, τ cipherAEADu JxK X JyK = H.
The length function lenAEAD. The function lenAEAD :
Terms Ñ N computes the length of a term if interpreted
as a bitstring, in other words lenAEAD(f lpt1, t2, ..., tnq)
:= |(MAEADf )(c1, c2, ..., cn; r)|. The length regularity of
lenAEAD (and therefore of our implementation) follows
directly from the construction of AEAD schemes.
The interpretation function openAEAD. The open function
for AEAD is defined as follows:
Listing 7: openAEAD
openAEAD(c, L)
if c P JTAEADKAEAD X dom(L) then
return (c, L(c))
else if c = xk, τkxAEADy then
return (c, glpcq
AEADkx
)
else if c = xn1, τnAEADy then
return pc, τnAEAD)
else if c = xc1, τ cipherAEADy then
extract Hˆ = (H, J) from c’
extract nˆ = (n1, τnAEAD) from c’
for each (kˆ, khxpq) P L do
parse kˆ as xk, τkxAEADy
let m := DAEN.Dec(k, n1, H, c’)
if m ­“ K then
return (c, Elpcqx (kˆ, nˆ, Hˆ, m))
return (c, glpcq
AEADcipher
)
else
return (c, glpcqJ )
openAEAD returns (c, g
lpcq
J ) for any foreign bitstring and
its behavior is in all cases independent on any foreign
bitstring in the library. Since openAEAD therefore fulfills
the conditions of Definition 5 in the full version [5], our
implementation is type safe.
The validAEAD predicate. The validAEAD predicate is
dependent on a set of terms S that specifies which terms can
be turned into IVs by ι. As the IV space is typically finite (e.g.
for GCM mode), and ι is injective, S needs to be restricted,
too. Our result is parametric in S, S1 and ι. We may define S
as a subset of the set of terms that is defined by composition,
e.g., to derive S from a transparent model. We therefore fix
some model M “ pT ,ď,Σ, Dq and its deduction sound
implementation I to compose with, such that M and I are
composable with MAEAD and IAEAD regarding the re-
quirements from Section B.4 in the full version [5]. We then
choose S Ă TermspΣYΣAEAD, T YTAEAD,ď Y ďAEADq
such that any bitstring representation for any term t P S is
in S1.
Formally, for any A and any a parameterized trans-
parent symbolic model Mtranpνq with a corresponding
parameterized implementation Itranpνq such that Mtranpνq
and Itranpνq are composable with M Y MAEAD and
I Y IAEAD regarding the requirements from Section B.4
in the full version [5] for ν being send by the adversary
A, we require that for the library L at any moment in any
instance of the deduction soundness game
DSpMYMAEADqYMtranpνq,pIYIAEADqYItranpνqpηq
it holds that @s1.LJs1K P S ðñ s1 P S1.
For an appropriately chosen S, we can now define
validAEAD as follows:
1q We demand that the trace T starts with exactly one
init query ”init T,H” where at least one of them
could be an empty list.
2q The adversary is not allowed to use Ex in the the init
query.
3q iq For the query ”init T,H” it should hold that:
˚ the function symbol kc should only occur in a
term klcpq P T .˚ the function symbol kh should only occur in a
term klhpq P H .
iiq For each label l of klx, l should be unique in T YH .
iiiq Whenever klxpq occurs in a generate query, klxpq
must have occurred in the init query before.
ivq Except generation, klxpq should only occur in Ex as
its first argument.
This rules guarantee that all keys are generated in the
init query.
4q No tuple of pconSpnq, H,mq occurs twice in some trace
T. In other words, we demand that for every term
Expklxpq, conSpnq, H,mq pconSpnq, H,mq is different
in each ”init T,H”, ”generate t” or ”sgenerate
t” queries. (For all terms Expklxpq, conSpnq, H,mq,
Expklxpq, conSpn1q, H 1,m1q P T it has to hold that
pconSpnq, H,mq ­“ pconSpn1q, H 1,m1q.
5) For each term conSpnq, n P S.
These rules guarantee that all keys which may be used by
the adversary are generated in the init query. They also
guarantee that the adversary has to decide which keys are
corrupted and which keys are honest during initialization,
because we only allow static corruption of keys. Further-
more, to prevent key cycles, keys are only allowed to be used
for encryption and decryption. At last, the rules guarantee
the freshness of the used nonces.
For all parse and generate requests of the adversary
on the trace T all validAEAD conditions must be fulfilled.
